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ABSTRACT
Employing the critical juncture theory (CJT), a discursive institutionalist approach, this paper
examines the nature of the changes to Irish industrial policy, and Mexican macroeconomic
policy, during early the 1980s, a time when both countries went through economic crises.
Did these policy changes constitute transformations, or were they simply continuations of
previously established policy pathways? The CJT consists of three elements – economic
crisis, ideational change, and the nature of the policy change – that must be identified for us
to be able to declare with some certainty if the policy changes constituted critical junctures.
Our findings will help explain why Irish industrial policy did not undergo a radical
transformation during the 1980s, while Mexican macroeconomic policy underwent major
change in that decade.

Political Studies Association (UK) Annual Conference, 2015, Sheffield, UK
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INTRODUCTION
During the second half of the 1970s the Irish and Mexican economies performed relatively
well. Ireland recovered from the effect of the first oil shock, while Mexico discovered oil and
spent large sums on state enterprises. However, within a few short years circumstances in
both countries had changed, leading to questioning of extant industrial policy in Ireland and
macroeconomic policy in Mexico.
Sudden policy discontinuities are often attributed to, in a straightforward cause and
effect manner, economic crises. Yet, crises are often followed by policy continuity. Thus, it
is important to acknowledge that policy change is a complex process and that to understand it
we need to take account of political circumstances, and recognise that economic crises are a
necessary, but insufficient, condition for policy change.
We use the CJT to investigate this issue. According to Hogan (2006) a critical
juncture is a multi stage event that sets a process of policy change in motion. A crisis can
create a situation where extant policies and associated ideas are called into question. Any
subsequent displacement of the extant paradigm by a new set of ideas on how policy should
operate can lead to radical policy change. But, without ideational change, policy change will
likely be minor – the hierarchy of goals underpinning a policy will remain unaltered and
extant policy will soldier on.

COUNTRIES SELECTED FOR EXAMINATION
Ireland and Mexico, during the 1980s, are interesting cases. That decade saw both countries’
economies stagnate, forcing them to ask searching questions of extant policies.

Irish

industrial policy, reliant on foreign direct investment (FDI) as a stimulus for growth and
skills transfer (Girvin 1994, 125), was questioned as the economy slowed and unemployment
rose.

Mexico still had import substitution policies in place (Panizza 2005), something

abandoned in Ireland in the 1950s. In the midst of an international oil glut, the Mexican
economy was straining under the challenge of supporting government commitments assumed
in the 1970s following the discovery of oil. In both countries there was questioning of past
decisions and uncertainty.
In addition to having reached crossroads in their development, both countries were
selected using a most-similar and most-different case selection, in an effort to ensure that the
states, although in respects similar, providing comparable data, are sufficiently different to
permit contrasting findings (Gerring 2007). The selection requirements for “most similar”
are that both countries are democracies and advanced capitalist states.

While we are

examining industrial policy change in Ireland and macroeconomic policy change in Mexico,
both cases constitute policy-making at national level. The case studies’ similarities ensure
‘the contexts of analysis are analytically equivalent, at least to a significant degree’ (Collier
1997, 4).
They are most different in that Ireland is a unitary parliamentary republic whereas
Mexico is a federal presidential republic, their economies are very different – Mexico has the
one of the largest economy in the world while Ireland’s relatively small – and their
performances, and the policies governing them, varied dramatically. Mexico’s population is
over 25 times that of Ireland.
THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE LITERATURE
Critical junctures result in the adoption of a particular arrangement from among alternatives.
Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in that direction (Mahoney 2003, 53). For
some, a critical juncture constitutes an extended period of reorientation (Collier and Collier
1991; Mahoney 2003), while for others, it is a brief period when one direction, or another, is
taken (Garrett and Lange 1995; Hogan 2006). However, the literature is inconsistent in how
it differentiates critical junctures from other forms of policy change. Also, the literature often

examines critical junctures from the perspective of crises (exogenous shocks), emphasizing
the tensions that precede the important events that set policy change in motion. Hogan
(2006) sought to resolve these issues by setting out a revised CJT.
According to Hogan and Cavatorta (2013), a critical juncture consists of discreet, but
interconnected elements: crisis, ideational change (extant ideational collapse, new ideational
consolidation) and radical policy change. Thus, CJT uses ideas in a form of “discursive
institutionalism” to overcome the limitations of historical institutionalism in explaining
policy change (Schmidt 2008; 2010). Discursive institutions are not rule following structures
of the older institutionalisms that serve as restraints on actors, but are internal to agents as
constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning (Schmidt 2010). Hogan and
Cavatorta (2013) argue that, in the wake of a crisis, outside influencers (public, media, NGOs
etc), policy entrepreneurs (civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists, interest groups)
and political entrepreneurs (elected politicians) act, in the words of Kleistra and Mayer
(2001), as either carriers, or barriers, to policy change. Discursive interaction (exchange of
ideas) between these policy elites and the general public generates the alternative ideas that
may lead to collective action (Schmidt 2008). The attention to entrepreneurial agency, and to
the role of discourse, constitutes an effort to ‘endogenize’ policy change (Schmidt 2010) –
making the exogenous shocks, so important to historical institutionalism, less significant.
Using the CJT to examine the nature of industrial policy change in Ireland and
macroeconomic policy change in Mexico during the 1980s involves using observable
implications to test for a crisis, ideational change and the nature of the policy change. The
stronger the evidence supports the observables, the greater the indication that a critical
juncture occurred. The framework (set out below) has been used to study a variety of policy
topics including changing trade union influence on public policy and economic policy change
in nondemocratic states (see Hogan 2006; Hogan and Cavatorta 2013).

APPLYING CJT
Testing for a Crisis
A crisis implies extant policies are failing to address a problem (Boin, Hart, Stern, &
Sundelius 2005) and as a result can unleash powerful forces for change (Haggard 2003).
Economic crises are more common in modern democracies than wars or revolutions. Hogan
and Cavatorta’s (2013) CJT, recognising that identifying a macro-economic crisis is difficult,
involving subjective and objective deliberations, uses 12 encompassing observable
implications that draw upon currency crisis, recession and policy reform work of Garuba
(2006), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2003), Pei & Adesnik (2000, 139) and Yu, Lai, &
Wang (2006, 439). These observables identify changes in nominal economic performance
and perceptions of economic health (See Appendix A).

Testing for Ideational Change
Ideational change can result in a transformed policy environment, but understanding how
ideas influence policy is challenging. The failure of extant policies to resolve a crisis
provides a window of opportunity for change agents to contest the viability of the underlying
paradigm (Kingdon 1995). These agents can gain power for their ideas by setting the agenda
for reform in the policy sphere (Schmidt 2010).
To understand how ideas underlying failing policies are sometimes replaced, resulting
in radical policy change, whereas at other times they are merely altered, resulting in minor
policy change, Donnelly and Hogan (2012), drawing on Legro (2000), Kingdon (1995), Dahl
(1963) and Hogan and Feeney (2012), argue that significant policy change depends upon a
range of change agents (outside influencers and policy entrepreneurs) perceiving the extant
paradigm as inadequate (collapse) and coalescing (consolidation) around a set of new ideas,
championed by a political entrepreneur. Political entrepreneurs act as a bridge between

coalitions advocating new policy ideas and the institutions implementing them. Thus, once
the new policy idea becomes accepted amongst policy entrepreneurs and the political elite a
new policy monopoly, and stasis, is instituted (Meijernik 2005). As Blyth (2002, 37) argues,
‘ideas facilitate the reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources among
agents who attempt to resolve the crisis.’ Ideational change constitutes the intermediating
factor between a crisis and policy change. Based on Donnelly and Hogan's (2012) CJT
framework, we set out seven observable implications for identifying extant ideational
collapse and new ideational consolidation (See Appendix B).
However, ‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a
replacement could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old
orthodoxy’ (Legro 2000, 424). Even in the wake of a crisis, policy failure and ideational
collapse, there is no guarantee new ideas will become policy. This is because in addition to
policy viability, policy ideas must have administrative and political viability (Hall 1989).

Testing for Policy Change
The CJT leads us to expect significant policy change after political entrepreneur-led
consolidation around a new idea (ideational change) in the wake of a crisis. Thus, the CJT's
final stage employs Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second and their order change to develop
observables implications to enable us identify and differentiate, normal and fundamental
shifts in policy (See Appendix C). The observables incorporate Hogan's (2006) notions of
swift and enduring change. This addresses the problem in policy dynamics of defining and
operationalizing the scope and timing of policy change (Howlett 2009). As Capano and
Howlett (2009) argue, when a policy is regarded as fundamental it is usually based on a
multi-year perspective. These observables enabled the differentiation of policy changes,

from minor adjustments, to the setting of policy instruments, to paradigm changes in policy
goals (Hall 1993).

Evaluation of the Findings
To evaluate the evidence the finding for each observable implication are evaluated
independently by each author and assigned a score to indicate strong (3), medium (2), weak
(1) or no support (0). The stronger the inter-coder agreement between the researchers’
findings, the more confidence we have.

This approach allows for a more nuanced

understanding of policy change. As interpretation plays a part in divining meaning from
codes, the reporting of findings involves thick description of categories and contexts (Polgar
& Thomas 2008, 248). We found inter-coder agreement to be on average very high, and
Krippendorff’s alphas to be regularly above 0.8, which Krippendorff (2004, 241) deems
reliable beyond chance (see Appendix D).

IDENTIFICATION OF MACROECONOMIC CRISIS
The Irish economy in the early 1980s
During the late 1970s the Irish economy performed relatively well, having recovered from the
oil crisis. Inflation and unemployment fell, while growth returned (Leddin and Walsh 1998,
26). We can see from Table 1 that real gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 4.5 percent
between 1975 and 1979.
In 1977, a new Fianna Fáil government employed expansionary fiscal policy when the
economy was growing at an unsustainable rate (OECD 1982, 10). This “dash for growth”,
led to deterioration in fiscal balances (FitzGerald 2000, 43) and the public sector accounts
(OECD 1983, 7). We can see from Table 1 that inflation peaked at 20.4 percent in 1981,
while interest rates remained high.

Table 1 – Ireland’s main economic indicators
Year

Unemployment
Inflation
%
%
1974
5.4
17.0
1975
7.3
20.9
1976
9.0
18.0
1977
8.8
13.6
1978
8.1
7.6
1979
7.1
13.2
1980
7.3
18.2
1981
9.9
20.4
1982
11.4
17.1
1983
13.6
10.5
1984
15.4
8.6
1985
16.7
5.4
1986
17.1
3.8
1987
17.7
3.1
1988
16.4
2.1
1989
15.1
4.1
Sources: European Commission (1997);
Mitchell (1992); United Nations (2014).

Interest
Government Debt Growth Rates in
Economic
%
to GNP ratio
Real GDP %
Openness1
12
55.39
4.2
94.37706
10
58.05
2.0
86.44022
14.8
62.5
2.1
94.96721
6.8
61.4
6.9
102.0045
11.9
63.5
6.7
103.7894
16.5
70.65
2.4
109.601
14.0
71.91
1.9
106.4831
16.5
77.45
1.1
105.0999
14.0
86.53
-0.7
97.81183
12.3
97.60
-1.6
101.7349
14
106.28
2.3
112.7388
10.3
108.60
0.8
112.172
13.3
123.26
-1.1
101.1026
9.3
124.07
4.6
104.8707
8.0
117.35
4.4
109.5299
12.0
106.84
7.0
117.0717
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002); Leddin and Walsh (1998);

As the economy slowed and unemployment and interest rates rose, emigration increased
(OECD 1982). In 1981, the balance of payments deficit reached 13 percent of GNP (Central
Bank of Ireland 1982, 16). Government spending was so high that the budget for 1981 had
been exhausted by midyear. Consequently, almost half of exchequer borrowing for 1981
went to financing the budget deficit (Bacon et al. 1986, 6), which stood at 7.3 percent of GNP
(Leddin and O’Leary 1995, 167).
The debt to GNP ratio surpassed 100 percent by 1984. In just 4 years the national
debt that had taken 57 years to accumulate was doubled (The Irish Times 1981a, 6). Imports
and exports fluctuated wildly, reflected in trade openness in Table 1.

Only inflation

improved after 1981. By 1986, the economy stagnant since 1980, contracted for the third
time in five years (see Table 1). An Irish Independent poll found a majority of citizens
skeptical of the politicians’ ability to run the country (O’Regan 1981, 1).

1

Measured by the trade to GDP ratio. This is acquired by adding the value of imports and exports and dividing
by GDP.

By the mid 1980s there was unanimity in the domestic and foreign media concerning
the economy. Finlan (1987, 16) writing in The Irish Times, described the economy as “on the
ropes”. The Economist pointed out that by 1987 ‘the people of Ireland were deeply in debt to
the outside world, three times as much per head as Mexico’ (The Economist 1987, 53). The
Irish Times (1987a, 10) noted that some economic commentators were even advocating debt
repudiation.
While initially boosting the economy, the government's debt-finance plan for rapid
development between 1977 and 1980 was a disaster (O'Rourke 2010). Bacon et al. (1986, 1)
observed that ‘the first half of the decade of the 1980s, taken as a whole, was a period of
appalling economic performance.’ Kennedy and Conniffe (1986, 288) had to conclude ' that
Irish economic performance has been the least impressive in Western Europe, perhaps in all
Europe'. The Central Bank (1987, 7) foresaw no immediate prospects for improvements in
growth or employment, and the OECD (1987, 77). ‘By the mid-1980s a number of acute
imbalances confronted the Irish economy’. The Small Firms Association noted steadily
declining business confidence (The Irish Times 1987b, 6).
After 1982 all political parties agreed on the need to stabilise the debt/GNP ratio
(Mjøset 1992, 381). Prime Minister FitzGerald acknowledged that the national debt and
interest payments, rising faster than national income, constituted a vicious circle, each year
consuming a larger share of taxation (The Irish Times 1987c, 10). Public consensus held that
the country was in the midst of a serious financial crisis (Cooney 1987, 1).

The Mexican economy in the early 1980s
From the 1940s, Mexico adopted an import substitution policy (Narula 2002).

This

decreased the country’s foreign dependence, as demand grew for raw materials. However,
the private sector became tariff dependent.

Fiscal and monetary order collapsed under the Echeverria’s (1970-1976)
administration - a time of falling agricultural exports, rapid population growth, and middle
class disillusionment with single party (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) domination
(Narula 2002). Once oil reserves were discovered by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in the
late 1970s (Calderón-Madrid 1997), there was hope this would stabilise the economy.
However, this only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis, without resolving the
structural problems (Nelson 1990, 95).
Table 2 – Mexico’s main economic iindicators
Year

Unemployment
Inflation
Interest
Government
Growth rates in
(%)
(%)
%
Debt/GNP ratio
real GDP
1974
7.2
23.75
N/A
19.73
5.78
1975
7.2
15.15
11.9
21.17
5.74
1976
6.7
15.79
11.8
27.62
4.42
1977
8.8
29
12.9
39.18
3.38
1978
6.9
17.45
15.1
35.86
8.96
1979
5.7
18.17
16.4
32.79
9.69
1980
4.2
26.36
20.7
30.53
9.22
1981
4.2
27.93
28.6
32.59
8.77
1982
6.8
58.92
40.4
53.3
-0.63
1983
6.9
101.7
56.7
66.53
-4.2
1984
5.6
65.54
51.1
57.28
3.61
1985
4.4
57.75
56.1
55.2
2.59
1986
4.3
86.23
80.9
82.75
-3.75
1987
3.9
131.8
94.6
82.02
1.86
1988
3.5
114.16
67.6
56.41
1.25
1989
2.9
20.01
44.6
43.71
4.2
Sources: Data Gov (2014); Fleck and Sorrentino (1994); Mitchell (2007), UNdata (2014)

Economic
Openness
18.98
16.5
18.35
20.54
21.83
23.64
23.68
23.34
25.64
28.42
26.95
25.74
30.77
32.88
38.46
38.08

Once a net petroleum exporter, pressure grew for Mexico to expand public spending.
Consequently, state ownership in enterprises quadrupled (Calderón-Madrid 1997). Under
President Portillo (1976-1982) expenditure outstripped petroleum revenues and an anaemic
taxation system, overheating the economy (Solís 1981). As a result, Mexico had to borrow
$78bn. (Alarcon and McKinley 1992). The peso became overvalued as inflation rose, and the
competiveness of exports, apart from oil, diminished (McCaughan 1993).
Mexico was extremely vulnerable when oil prices fell in the early 1980s.2
Compounding matters, PEMEX and the Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (SPP),

2

Time Magazine, 22 February, 1982.

declared oil revenues insufficient to revive the economy.3 Recession in the US reduced
demand for Mexican goods, while an increase in interest rates reduced the money supply, and
put pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had lent the country $25 billion. The
servicing of Mexico’s debts surpassed its oil revenues (Cornelius 1985, 89). By 1982, as
economic confidence waned, Mexicans began converting pesos to dollars.4 ‘Collapsing oil
prices and rising international interest rates erased Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr 2006, 53).
The gravity of the situation came to international attention on August 13, 1982, when:
The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing that it could
not meet interest payments coming due within the next few days and initiating
negotiations for bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury,
the IMF, and the private commercial banks (Nelson 1990, 97).

Mexico’s economic indicators pointed towards crisis (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991).
GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 1982 and 4.2 percent in 1983, while the inflation reached
58.92 percent in 1982 (Katz 1994). Output fell,5 real unemployment jumped towards 15
percent,6 while more than 20 million people, half the workforce, were underemployed
(Cornelius 1985, 92).

Compounding matters, US banks stopped lending to Mexican

companies as they owed US$600 million in unpaid interest.7 The budget deficit stood at 16.5
percent of GDP.8
According to Edwards (1995, 17) this was the worst crisis to hit Mexico since the
Great Depression. The Third World Magazine9, Gestión y Estrategia10, and Time Magazine11
3

Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura,. January, 1982. “De Díaz Mirón a Díaz Serrano”.
Time Magazine, 30 August, 1982.
5
ibid.
6
ibid, 20 December, 1982.
7
ibid, 1 January, 1983.
8
ibid., 20 December, 1982.
9
The Third World Magazine, October, 1983. IMF: quick fix- slow poison,
10
Gestión y Estrategia, Calderón, Gilberto, July, 1991. Privatización de la Banca en México.
11
Time Magazine, 15 July, 1987. ‘Last Bow of the Inflation Tamer’.
4

referred to Mexico’s difficulties as a crisis. Minimum wages were insufficient to meet the
needs of most citizens (Lustig 1986). Opinion polls found great scepticism concerning the
economy (Basañez 1985).
During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice to increase exports (Katz 1994). New
short term loans were taken to counteract capital flight, but did little (Jiménez 2006). Banco
de Mexico’s reserves dried up in a matter of weeks.12 In his Sixth Presidential Report,
Portillo stated that the economy was experiencing the worst crisis in its history. 13
Bailey (1980, 54) identified trends that produced economic panic: excessive
government outlays; $15 billion in short-term loans which funded capital flight; an
overvalued peso; and dollarization. Despite growing by 8 percent annually between 1978 and
1981, by the end of 1982, Mexico faced one of the severest crises in its history (Barker and
Brailovsky 1983).
Table 3 – Identification of macroeconomic crisis early 1980s
Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis
Coder 1 Coder 2
Ireland
Ireland
O1. Stagnant or negative GDP growth
3
3
O2. Unemployment above 10 percent
3
3
O3. Inflation and interest rates above 10
2
2
percent
O4. National debt, as a percentage of GDP,
3
3
increasing at more than 10 percent,
annually
O5. The level of economic openness
3
2
declining
O6. Public perceives economic crisis
2
2
O7. Media perceive economic crisis
3
3
O8. Economic/political
commentators
3
3
perceive economic crisis
O9. Central bank perceives economic crisis
3
3
O10. OECD perceives economic crisis
3
3
O11. Elected representatives perceive
3
3
economic crisis
O12. Government pronouncements consistent
3
3
with crisis management approach
Strong
Strong
12
13

Latin America Regional Reports, 13 August, 1982, p. 1.
Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1 st, 1982.

Coder 1
Mexico
3
0
3

Coder 2
Mexico
3
0
3

2

2

1

1

2
3
3

2
3
3

3
3
3

3
3
3

3

3

Strong

Strong

(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available

From Table 3, we see that both authors felt the majority of observable implications supported
the argument that Ireland and Mexico experienced economic crises during the 1980s. The
next section tests for ideational change in industrial policy in Ireland and macroeconomic
policy in Mexico during this crisis.

IDENTIFICATION OF IDEATIONAL CHANGE
The Ideas Underlying Irish Industrial Policy
From the 1950s, Ireland sought to attract labour intensive industries based around technically
mature products (Lee 1992). In the context of weak indigenous industry, this seemed capable
of delivering development (Lee 1992). By the beginning of the 1970s FDI accounted for the
majority of new manufacturing jobs and exports. However, this led to the sidelining of
indigenous industry in the policy process (Girvin 1989). It failed to create high value jobs
and foreign companies were footloose (O’Malley 1985). In response, by the early 1970s the
Industrial Development Authority (IDA) sought to attract more sophisticated overseas
producers (Wrigley 1985). The economic problems of the 1970s led to a questioning of
industrial policy.
The 1973 Cooper-Whelan report, co-authored by Noel Whelan, a civil servant, who
later became Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, was sceptical of the long term
benefits of FDI (Lee 1992). By 1979, it was clear that the success of the FDI sector was not
finding its way into the rest of the economy (Lee 1992). This situation impelled the National
Economic and Social Council (NESC), then under Whelan's chairmanship, to commission an
examination of the industrial programme (Brunt 1988, 32). The objective was “to ensure that
the Irish government’s industrial policy is appropriate to the creation of an internationally

competitive industrial base in Ireland which will support increased employment and higher
living standards” (Telesis 1982, 3).
A Review of Industrial Policy, referred to as the Telesis Report, after praising the
clarity and consistency of that policy, highlighted the negative impact of FDI on job creation
and its failure to create linkages with indigenous industry (Telesis 1982). Pointing out that
sustained economic development and a high income economy relies on native
entrepreneurship, the report queried the policy emphasis on foreign investment (Lee 1992,
531) and a culture of dependence on state aid (Sweeny 1998, 103). The report encouraged a
shift “towards building strong indigenous companies in the export and sub-supply business
sector” (Sweeny 1998, 127) and that the proportion of funds given to domestic industries
(one third of funding) be doubled by the end of the decade (Telesis 1982). The report "sent
shock waves through the policy establishment" (Lee 1992, 532). Deputy Prime Minister,
Dick Spring, admitted Telesis pointed to failings in the overall industrial policy framework
(Dáil Debates 342, cols. 861, 11 May 1983).
There was ideational collapse (see Table 4) as Whelan, the NESC, Telesis and a host
of other policy entrepreneurs critiqued the orthodoxy underlying extant industrial policy,
while other change agents in the media and trade unions supported the ideas proposed by
Telesis. Telesis found that the failure to develop native skills in technology and marketing,
meant ‘the foundations of the industrial superstructure therefore lacked depth” (Kennedy,
1986: 49). The scale of the policy changes required by Telesis would take time to implement
and take effect (Kennedy 1983, 34).

[However] the period from December 1979 to December 1982 was one of
the most remarkable periods in modern Irish history.

There were four

changes of Taoiseach in that period, six Ministers for Finance, three changes

of government and the Irish economy declined progressively to a level
unprecedented for decades. (Browne 1983, 5)

In this environment, changing extant industrial policy in a coherent fashion, despite the
collapse of its underlying ideas, proved difficult. Thus, ‘not only economically, but also
politically, instability peaked in 1981-1982’ (Mjøset 1992, 381).
By November 1982, when the majority Fine Gael-Labour Coalition came to power,
the state of the public finances restricted government to austerity measures. For some, this
government's 1984 White Paper on Industrial Policy “represented a pivotal document in the
re-evaluation of the philosophy and strategic thrust of industrial policy” (Boylan 1996, 196).
There were indeed “several changes in the content of industrial policy” in response to Telesis
(Kennedy 1995, 59). It was acknowledged that "Industrial policies which had clearly served
Ireland well in the 1960s and 1970s are now having less success" (Government of Ireland
1984, 3) and recognized that economic “flexibility, creativity and growth were all being
thwarted by the dependence on foreign investment” (Munck 1993, 158). Yet, in concert with
Telesis (1982), the White Paper stated there would be no radical change to incentives for FDI
- "consistency and stability over many years of our policies for industrial development have
been a major source of strength" (Government of Ireland 1984, 7).

The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy
Traditionally PRI presidents operated populist-redistributive models (Sandersen 1983). In
1976, when Portillo became president, he was forced to consider expenditure reductions due
to the economic downturn following the first oil crisis (Woodhead 1980). However, with the
discovery of vast oil reserves, he adopted a patronage model that sought to incorporate
expansive state expenditure with rapid industrialisation (Bailey 1980).

Initially, this

continuation of the populist approach resulted in high growth rates (see Table 1), but as the
economy grew reliant on oil revenues it became increasingly vulnerable.

Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive policiesespecially tax reform-would have entailed, both the Echeverria administration
(1970-1976) and the Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the
entire economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy, as
banker, entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius 1985, 88).

Despite oil revenues, Mexico became increasingly dependent on foreign borrowing to
meet its expenditure commitments (Prest 1982). Once oil prices fell and interest rates rose,
Mexico faced the prospect of defaulting on its debts. In response, in early 1982 the Portillo
administration introduced a detailed plan to stabilise the economy (Taylor and Lopez 1992).
The ideas underlying extant economic policy were coming under increasing strain.
The economic crisis dominated the 1982 presidential election. The PRI put forward
fiscal conservative Miguel De La Madrid as its candidate (Nelson 1990). This was the result
of shifts in a more conservative direction within the inner circles of the PRI (Sandersen
1983). The choice of De La Madrid marked a rupture from the party’s revolutionary
ideology. With the economy in crisis, and a sense that the PRI and traditional politics were
failing to meet the challenges confronting the country, free market advocates demanded a
president who would support the rights of private property (Luna, Tirado and Valdes 1987).
Throughout the campaign, which he ultimately won, De La Madrid emphasised the
differences between his proposed government and the outgoing Portillo administration. In
his inauguration address he declared his opposition to populism and institutional corruption
(Cornelius 1985). He stressed that a new moral, political and economic approach was needed.

Locked into the conditionality of a harsh IMF bailout, negotiated by the outgoing
administration, De La Madrid presented a detailed programme for policy change (Golob
2003).
The range of options open to the government was limited. External financing had
dried up in the aftermath of the economic crisis, while oil revenues remained stagnant. Even
when oil prices began to recover, PEMEX did not have the capacity take advantage of the
situation. It was clear that to maintain economic, political, and social order, a break with the
past was required. Acting as a political entrepreneur, De La Madrid championed a new set of
ideas on how to manage the economy. Change agents, led by De La Madrid, consolidated
around this replacement set of ideas. These involved moving the economy away from import
substitution, towards a more open approach to international trade.
Table 4 – Indication of ideational collapse
Indication of Extant Ideational
Collapse
O13. Media questioning efficacy of current
model
O14. Opposition critiques current model and
propose alternative ideas
O15. Policy entrepreneurs critique current
model and propose alternatives
O16. Civil society organizations critique
current model
O17. Widespread public dissatisfaction with
current paradigm
O18. External/international organizations
critique current model and actively
disseminate alternatives
Extant Ideational Collapse
(i) Indication
of
New
Ideational
Consolidation
O19. Clear set of alternative ideas
O20. Political entrepreneur combines interests
to produce consensus around a replacement
paradigm
O21. Political entrepreneur injecting new
ideas into policy arena
New Ideational Consolidation

Coder 1
Ireland

Coder2
Ireland

2

3

Coder 1
Mexico
3

Coder 2
Mexico
3

1

1

3

3

3

2

3

3

3

2

3

3

2

1

3

3

2

2

3

3

Strong

Medium

Strong

Strong

3
0

3
0

3
3

3
3

0

0

3

3

No

No

Yes

Yes

(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available

In Table 4, we see that all of the observable implications strongly support the belief that in
Mexico, during the early 1980s, the ideas underpinning extant economic policy, focused on
import substitution industrialization and protectionism, had collapsed.

Change agents’

alternative ideas on opening the economy to foreign trade and investment, championed in the
policy making environment by De La Madrid acting as a political entrepreneur, consolidated
around these. In Ireland, in the absence of a political entrepreneur willing to champion the
alternative ideas of the policy entrepreneurs, change agents failed to consolidate around a
replacement orthodoxy to extant industrial policy.

IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY CHANGE
Changes in Irish industrial policy
Under the coalition government (1982-1987), incentives were more selectively deployed,
while indigenous enterprises were given greater attention through the creation of a National
Development Corporation (NDC). The objective was to foster an increase in the number of
internationally traded companies, and to that end an export development scheme was
established. There was some change in relation to FDI, with more of a focus on foreign
companies with R&D functions and the potential for linkages with domestic enterprises.
1984 saw the introduction of the Company Development Programme to assist
indigenous companies planning (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013, 29). In 1985, the National
Linkage Programme sought to achieve a more integrated development pattern between
indigenous and foreign enterprises (Brunt 1988, 32). The objectives of these programmes,
with their focus on indigenous enterprises, was addressing weaknesses in management and
marketing; achieving better value for money and creating better linkages with FDI (Kennedy
1995). The Irish Export Board (Córas Tráchtála) sought to address the information needs of
exporters, as identified in the White Paper, through the production of guides for exporting.

"The Telesis report led to some measure of industrial policy reform, though this was
less interventionist than the report envisaged” (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013, 29). Industrial
policy gradually responded to the critiques of Telesis (1982) and the NESC (1982) (Ó’Gráda
1997). However, to regard the policy changes arising from Telesis, and the subsequent White
Paper, as a break with extant industrial policy would be incorrect.

States tend to be

predisposed towards those policies with which they already have some favourable experience
(Hall, 1989). Rather, they constituted a form of, what Streeck and Thelen (2005) refer to as,
policy layering – an effort to make extant policy work. Despite Telesis, grants to indigenous
firms increased by only 3 percent between 1985 and 1989 (O’Hearn 2001, 105). Industrial
policy was adjusted in 1984, not transformed, due to a reluctance to break with past success
in attracting FDI.
Although the ideas underlying extant industrial policy might have collapsed in the
wake of the economic crisis, and provided a window of opportunity for radical policy change,
this did not occur. Whelan, the NESC and Telesis, along with many other economists and
commentators, acting as policy entrepreneurs, proposed alternative ideas to those underlying
industrial policy.

However, in the absence of these change agents clustering around a

political entrepreneur to champion their alternative paradigm in the policy-making
environment, new ideational consolidation did not occur. Despite the growing recognition
that industrial policy was failing to produce the desired results, the Irish political
establishment was reluctant to abandon a policy prescription that had, at least during the
1960s and early 1970s, ended a century of depopulation and economic stagnation. No
political entrepreneur emerged during this period of ideational contestation. Politicians only
seemed interested in variations on the existing paradigm. This was partly down to the fact
that Ireland, at the time, experienced a period of weak and unstable governments (The Irish
Times 1981b, 12). In these circumstances, the ideas underpinning extant industrial industrial

policy endured. The collective mindset failed to disengaged from reliance on FDI and shift
the focus of industrial policy to indigenous enterprise.

Changes in Mexican economic policy
In his inaugural address, De La Madrid declared Mexico was in an emergency (Russell, Bolte
and Lopez 1982, 30) and set out a program of austerity measures (Lustig 1998).

He

appointed 11 cabinet ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI (Nelson 1990).
Consequently, his cabinet supported his efforts to stabilize and open the economy –
prioritising the attraction of FDI and focusing on high tech industries (Aboites 1983; Lustig
1992).
Macroeconomic stabilisation became the priority (Cornelius 1985). De La Madrid’s
first budget, aiming at reducing the deficit by 50 percent, was draconian (Russell, Bolte and
Lopez 1982). The budgets he sent to Congress in 1983 and 1984 represented a sustained
austerity drive (Cornelius 1985). The peso was pegged at a more "realistic" exchange rate
and plans were introduced to restructure the bureaucracy.

De La Madrid introduced

conventional monetary and fiscal austerity, and more extensive trade liberalisation. For
decades free trade had been “the policy option that dare not speak its name” (Golob 2003,
370). The Mexican government also adopted a less confrontational approach to the IMF and
was able to reach agreement on an adjustment program to revive the economy (Nelson 1990).
This allowed the country avoid a debt moratorium (ISG 1982; Looney 1985).
Recognising that Mexico could not rely on oil revenues, De La Madrid sought to
privatise public enterprises, 1,155 of which were sold. There was an effort to combine
structural change and macroeconomic stabilisation, with a focus on export orientated
industries (Cornelius 1985). Power was decentralised to the states to foster competition
between their governments and economies, and in so doing help encourage the development

of private industries and investment. The overall objective was integration of the Mexican
economy into the global economy.
These policies were to have a long lasting impact upon Mexico’s economic, and
social, development (Cornelius 1985).

The change to neo-liberalism – marked by

privatisation and deregulation – was radical (Pastor and Wise 1997).

Mexico’s import

substitutions policies had concentrated on developing the internal market, while the new
approach focused on international forces as drivers of liberalisation (Middlebrook 2004).
Relaxation of restrictive FDI laws was a clear signal of the government’s desire to attract
foreign industries (Cornelius 1985) and allowed Mexican businesses forge relationships with
foreign firms. All of the reforms enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing the
public sector deficit.
There was a transformation in the relationship between state and private sector
(Middlebrook 2004). For decades, the PRI had held private sector interests at arms length
(Golob 2003). As private sector development became crucial to the country’s economic
revival, its growing importance gave it more influence over the formulation of economic
policy and increased access to the government. Under De La Madrid, all sections of society
gained a voice in a general liberalisation.
Mexican economic history can be divided into pre and post 1982. The crisis saw the
development of a new set of economic policies and a new approach to economic
management. In the wake of the crisis, and the change in ideas underlying economic policy,
Mexico experienced a third-order change in macroeconomic policy (see Hall 1993). State
control was replaced by the market, public ownership by private ownership and protectionism
by competition (Lustig 2001; Pastor and Wise 1997). From 1982, Mexican economic policy
started down a different path, culminating in accession to NAFTA.

Table 5 – Indication of level of policy change
Indication of Level of Policy Change
O22. Policy instrument settings changed
O23. Instruments of policy changed
O24. Goals behind policy changed
Critical Juncture in Policy

Coder 1
Ireland

Coder2
Ireland

3
1
0
No

3
2
0
No

Coder 1
Mexico
3
3
3
Yes

Coder 2
Mexico
3
3
3
Yes

(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available

In Table 5 the observable implications show that Irish industrial policy’s instruments’ settings
changed – constituting a first order policy change. In Mexico, the observable implications
show strong evidence that after 1982 macroeconomic policy’s instruments’ settings, the
instruments themselves, and goals all changed, constituting, according to Hall (1993), a third
order policy change.
According to the CJT, in Ireland, although the ideas underpinning industrial policy's
focus on FDI collapsed in the wake of an economic crisis, the absence of a political
entrepreneur willing to champion alternative ideas meant change agents failed to consolidate
around alterative policies, resulting in minor policy change. There was no critical juncture in
industrial policy.
However, the third order policy change in Mexico, occurring in the wake of an
economic crisis and ideational change, constitutes a critical juncture. The strength of the
ideas underlying the import substitution policy ensured its continuity until the 1980s, when
the policy was found to be failing, and the ideas supporting it were undermined. Thereafter,
change agents, led by a political entrepreneur in President De La Madrid, consolidated
around neoliberal ideas, resulting in a transformation of Mexican macroeconomic policy.
These findings, highlighting that an economic crisis is a necessary, but insufficient,
condition for radical policy change, show the importance of ideational change in the policy
change process.

CONCLUSION

Comment [B1]: I think an interesting
thing worth discussing is was there a
change in Irish macroeconomic policy at
the time but not in Industrial policy.

This paper examined the economic difficulties in Ireland and Mexico in the early 1980s to
determine if there was a critical juncture in Irish industrial policy and Mexican economic
policy. According to theory, a critical juncture consists of a crisis, ideational change and
radical policy change, with ideational change linking crisis and policy change. Following a
crisis (policy failure) and extant ideational collapse, significant policy change depends upon
actors, led by a political entrepreneur, reaching consensus upon, and consolidating around,
new ideas. It is in the discursive interactions between the actors that ideas are generated
along with the potential for policy change.
Employing a range of observable implications, we found strong evidence of economic
crisis in Mexico in the early 1980s. In the midst of this crisis, the protectionist policy, having
been undermined by previous failures, was overcome by change agents, led by a political
entrepreneur, in the form of De La Madrid, consolidating around liberal economic ideas.
These involved opening the economy to free trade and pursuing FDI. Our findings suggest
that the policies adopted in response to the crisis involved altering the setting, instruments,
and hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic policy – a third order policy change. Thus,
we identified a crisis, ideational change, and radical change in macroeconomic policy, which
according to the CJT constitutes a critical juncture.
However, in Ireland there was no critical juncture in industrial policy. While the
observable implication indicate the economy was in crisis, and that this was undermining
confidence in the prevailing industrial policy (ideational collapse) - there was growing
skepticism among policy entrepreneurs of the long term benefits of reliance on FDI and in
particular its weak links with indigenous industry – a political entrepreneur willing to
champion a new set of ideas failed to emerge. The goals of industrial policy, implemented in
the 1950s endured, as the overarching, outward orientated, vision for the economy did not
change. There was recognition that a large number of jobs and a high percentage of FDI,

depend upon membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). Industrial policy
was altered to attract more sophisticated FDI that would create higher value jobs; and to
provide greater supports to indigenous industries – a first order policy change.
The CJT shows how ideas protect established policies. However, these ideas, having
been undermined during a crisis can be displaced by the consolidation of politicalentrepreneur-led change agents coalescing around new ideas. For the CJT ideational change
is the differentiating factor between a crisis followed by radical policy change and one
followed by minor policy change. This theory, and its observables, can be used to examine
changes in a variety of topics from foreign policy to education policy. As such, the CJT can
help us to better understand the impact of crises on policy making.
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Appendix A
O1. Stagnant or negative GDP growth (Pei & Adesnik, 2000).
O2. Unemployment above 10 percent (Pei & Adesnik, 2000).
O3. Inflation and interest rates above 10 percent (Pei & Adesnik, 2000).

O4. National debt, as a percentage of GNP, increasing at more than 10 percent, annually.
O5. The level of economic openness declining.
O6. Public perceives an economic crisis.
O7. National/international media perceive an economic crisis.
O8. Economic/political commentators perceive an economic crisis.
O9. Central bank perceives an economic crisis.
O10. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) perceives an
economic crisis.
O11. Elected representatives perceive an economic crisis.
O12. Government pronouncements on economy consistent with a crisis management
approach.
Appendix B
Indication of Extant Ideational Collapse
O13. Media question efficacy of the current model and/or specific policy areas.
O14. Opposition parties critique the current model and propose alternative ideas – at election
time their platform will be built around these alternatives.
O15. Civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists (policy entrepreneurs) critique the
current model and propose alternatives.
O16. Civil society organizations, e.g., labor unions, employer organizations, consumer
groups (policy entrepreneurs), critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s (1993)
coalition-centered approach.
O17. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through
opinion polls, protests, etc.

O18. External/international organizations (policy entrepreneurs) critique the current model
and/or actively disseminate alternative ideas.
Indication of New Ideational Consolidation
O19. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs.
O20. The political entrepreneur combines interests, including policy entrepreneurs, to
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm
O21. A political entrepreneur injecting new ideas into the policy arena.

Appendix C
Indication of Level of Policy Change
O22. Policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term
of office)
O23. The instruments of policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term
of office)
O24. The goals behind policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term
of office)

Appendix D
Ireland

Mexico

Krippendorff’s α

% Agreement

Krippendorff’s α

% Agreement

Crisis

0.758

91%

1

100%

Ideational

0.022

33%

*

100%

Collapse
Ideational

1

100%

*

100%

100%

*

100%

Consolidation
Policy Change 0.615

* Both coders attained 100 per cent agreement and both selected the same value for each
observable. Under this invariant values scenario, Krippendorff’s alpha is undefined.

